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Abstract 
As environmental crises, most notably climate change, become ever more 
severe, voices are reappearing that call for authoritarian solutions: 
Democracy, so the argument goes, has proven to be too slow to respond to 
urgent threats, and so a stronger, authoritarian hand is needed to push 
through the necessary socio-political changes. In this paper, we respond to 
this charge by revisiting the role of democracy within a transition to 
sustainable prosperity. We argue it is not democracy as such that is the 
problem, but rather democracy in its current form is itself constrained by 
structural and discursive forces including the almost hegemonic status of 
capitalist politico-economic discourses and tendencies towards short-
termism in political decision-making. Thus, instead of advocating further 
constraints on democracy, we explore new institutional and societal spaces 
that can revitalise democracy, ameliorating existing constraints and 
infusing sustainability politics with new ways of thinking. In particular we 
highlight the potential promise of participatory and deliberative 
innovations, prefigurative politics, reform of established structures and 
institutions, and deliberative systems and cultural change. The paper acts 
as an introduction to some of the political theory and political science 
aspects of the research programme of the Centre for the Understanding of 
Sustainable Prosperity (CUSP). 
Introduction 
As environmental crises such as climate change are worsening, it seems to 
some straightforward to point to a failure of democracy to prevent and 
resolve such challenges, and thus to a need for undemocratic, if not 
outright authoritarian measures instead. Democracy must be suspended, 
so the argument goes, until the crisis is overcome and we can ‘afford’ such 
luxury again. In what follows, we show why this argument is mistaken. It 
rests on a misconception of sustainability as a momentary instance of 
survival, when it actually denotes an ongoing process of adapting to 
continuously changing environmental conditions; and it too readily 
accepts the limits of contemporary liberal democratic practice as the limits 
of democracy as such. In this paper, we explore the alternative view that 
whilst critics are right to diagnose a need for structural change in modern 
societies, it is not democracy that produces unsustainability. Rather, 
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 democracy is itself constrained by the structural forces that generate 
unsustainability – most notably, a narrow capitalist political discourse and 
short-termism in political decision-making. Instead of further under-
mining dysfunctional democracy, the necessary structural change towards 
sustainability is more likely to emerge when democracy frees itself from 
these constraints, and can unleash more fully its capacity to induce 
reflection, inclusion, imagination and creativity. 
The notion of sustainable prosperity (Jackson 2017; Jackson et al. 2016) 
provides an important starting point for an alternative, democratic vision 
of long-term sustainability. As a holistic and complex normative goal for 
modern societies, it challenges any appeal of authoritarianism, 
incorporating democracy as a fundamental component. However, democ-
racy in its current constrained form remains insufficient as a basis for 
sustainable prosperity. Thus, in this paper, we make the case for a 
revitalised democratic route towards sustainable societies, engaging with 
innovations in democratic theory and practice that often point towards 
more participatory and deliberative forms of democratic action as ways of 
building more robust democratic responses to the sustainability challenge. 
Many of the ideas and practices explored in this paper will be interrogated 
in more detail as part of the political strand of the CUSP project, which 
focuses on the political and institutional foundations of new, post-growth 
forms of sustainable prosperity. Thus, the paper can be seen as mapping 
out a research agenda for this aspect of the interdisciplinary Centre, 
introducing relevant political innovations and setting them within a 
broader theoretical context.  
The paper has three main sections. First, we make the case for a 
democratic response to the sustainability challenge, refuting the 
authoritarian case as well as its eco-optimist counterpart, and highlighting 
how democracy is both instrumentally and intrinsically necessary for 
sustainable prosperity. In the second section, we make the argument that 
our current constrained democracy is not sufficient as a foundation for 
sustainable prosperity: the practices of contemporary liberal democratic 
capitalist systems undermine the search for sustainability. We focus on 
two significant constraints related to liberal capitalism and short-termism 
that restrict the necessary communication, reflection, and participation. 
Finally, we introduce a number of different approaches to democratic 
practice that could have a significant role in moving us beyond these 
constraints. The potential of these novel forms of democratic organisation 
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 and engagement will be the subject of further analysis as part of the 
research programme of CUSP. 
Rejecting eco-authoritarianism 
There is a long history of anti-liberal, if not outright authoritarian 
responses to environmental crises. As early as in the 1970s, in the wake of 
reports such as the Club of Rome’s Limits to Growth (Meadows et al. 1974), 
a number of scholars and activists advocated eco-authoritarianism in 
response to resource scarcity. For instance, William Ophuls argued that 
environmental problems – in particular, resource scarcity – cannot be 
solved by liberal polities, and thus made the case for ‘enlightened’ non-
democratic leadership (Ophuls 1977). If liberalism is incompatible with 
restricting the freedom to use resources, so the argument goes, only a non-
liberal regime can provide the solution to a scarcity crisis. In a similar vein, 
Robert Heilbroner suggested the individualistic, selfish and profit-driven 
character of liberal industrial societies means rationally acting people will 
not be able to avert environmental catastrophe – or handle any economic 
downturn required to avert it. For him, a government ‘capable of rallying 
obedience far more effectively than would be possible in a democratic 
setting’ is thus the only option (Heilbroner 1974: 110). 
The eco-authoritarian impulse appeared to dim with the collapse and 
exposure of the devastating environmental record of the centralised 
planned economies of the Soviet bloc (Shahar 2015). However, the growing 
recognition of more systemic challenges such as climate change increased 
the severity and urgency of the insights of Limits to Growth (Jackson 2009: 
8-14). In this new context, it is not surprising that eco-authoritarian voices 
began resurfacing with renewed vigour (Beeson 2010). David Shearman 
and Joseph Smith (2007: 1) have argued that liberal democracy cannot 
‘grasp’ the extent of the environmental crises, thus making the case for 
new authoritarian government models in which technocratic elites, as 
found for instance in Singapore, override democracy (pp. 124-6). Recent 
updates from the Limits to Growth team itself include some (in their own 
words) ‘controversial’ solutions (Maxton and Randers 2016: xvii, 104) that 
draw inspiration from Chinese policy and practice, in particular its 
‘centralized direction and control’ (ibid: 207). This new call for 
authoritarianism is finding resonances particularly in the scientific 
community, in which there is a growing ‘tendency to want to take 
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 decisions out of the hands of politicians and the public, and, given the 
“exceptional circumstances”, put the decisions in the hands of scientists 
themselves’ (Stehr 2015: 449). The influential author of the Gaia 
hypothesis, James Lovelock, explicitly appeals to such a state of exception:  
Even the best democracies agree that when a major war approaches, 
democracy must be put on hold for the time being. I have a feeling that climate 
change may be an issue as severe as a war. It may be necessary to put 
democracy on hold for a while. (Lovelock 2010) 
Similarly, Lord Martin Rees, Astronomer Royal and former President of the 
Royal Society recently argued: ‘Only an enlightened despot could push 
through the measures needed to navigate the 21st century safely’ (Rees 
2014).  
The main alternative to this eco-authoritarian agenda has been one of eco-
optimism – a confidence that policy and technological innovations, 
efficiency gains, and new forms of ‘green growth’ can economically 
‘internalise’ environmental ‘costs’ and offset scarcities. A paradigm shift 
towards ‘ecological modernisation’ is ‘presented as a means by which 
capitalism can accommodate the environmental challenge. Rather than 
environmental protection being a threat to capitalism, it is seen as a spur 
to a new phase of capitalist development’ (Gouldson and Murphy 1997: 75; 
see also Weale 1992; Spaargaren and Mol 1992; Ekins 1999; Porritt 2005). 
In other words, sustainability can be achieved within existing liberal-
capitalist frameworks without fundamental structural changes. Much ink 
has been spilt critiquing different aspects of the ecological modernisation 
storyline (Connelly et al. 2012: 73-79), not least the lack of evidence that 
the required absolute decoupling of growth from environmental damage is 
possible with increasing consumption (Jackson 2017, chapter 5). The 
continuing failure of contemporary democracies to make the difficult 
decisions necessary to move towards a low-carbon, sustainable future and 
the failure of ecological modernisation to attend to current weaknesses in 
the practice of democracy thus only play into the hands of the 
authoritarian alternative. 
But the eco-authoritarian solution has major limitations as a political 
response to our current predicament and as a mode of governance to 
achieve sustainable prosperity. While structural change is needed, 
authoritarianism is a poor foundation for that change. Benevolent, 
ecologically-minded authoritarian leadership might be imagined 
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 theoretically; yet in practice authoritarian regimes have a poor record not 
just environmentally, but at realising their own stated goals. Typically, 
authoritarianism engenders corruption and clientelism. As Carter (1999: 25) 
highlights, it is difficult to see how the kinds of structures that enable 
authoritarian leadership to come to power would then be able to prevent 
the exercise of this power from becoming corrupted and malevolent over 
time. There is no historical precedent for the sustainability of ecological 
benign leadership that eco-authoritarianism presumes; as elites in such 
position lack incentives to provide public goods, they are more likely to 
become rent-seeking for their own benefit (Ward 2008: 387; see also 
Burnell 2012: 823). At the same time, centralised power is always at threat 
from usurpers with less benevolent motives (Shahar 2015), if not attracting 
‘the most competitive, most ruthless and least caring’ types of leaders in 
the first place (Carter 1999: 26). Questions can also be raised about how 
stable an authoritarian form of governance would be given the widespread 
commitment to liberal and democratic values, particularly in currently 
existing democracies. Citizens may be disillusioned and disenchanted with 
current practices of political elites and institutions, but their commitment 
to democratic ideals remains strong (Dalton 2004). Thus, whilst the eco-
authoritarians’ diagnosis rightly points to the failure of democracy in its 
current form to bring about sustainability, it is unclear why the kind of 
structural change they advocate as an alternative – centralising power in 
the hands of a leadership strong enough to push through the required 
policies – would fare any better. 
On the other hand, even if it remained focused on sustainability in the 
name of the common good, an authoritarian government might simply not 
get it right. Hierarchical structures are more likely to erode than to nurture 
the kind of reflexivity and experimental disposition that are key to 
preventing crises and adapting to changing conditions. Closed settings 
insulated from outside contestation are more likely to suffer from ‘group 
think’ (Janis 1982) and path dependency (Dryzek 2016), and are thus poor 
at learning and adaptiveness (Stehr 2015: 450). Hierarchy and 
authoritarianism stifle open communication, including with those lending 
a voice to the concerns of nature (Niemeyer 2013: 433-4). Hence, even if an 
authoritarian response might deal more effectively with the immediate 
climate crisis compared to current political arrangements, this would come 
at the cost of undermining the very foundations for anticipating, 
preventing, and adapting to ongoing and future social and ecological crises 
and changes. Insofar as sustainability consists not just in the solution of 
  
 
 
 
 
6 | CUSP WORKING PAPER No. 8  
 one crisis, but requires ongoing learning and adaptation, it must therefore 
cultivate the foundations for open communication and engagement. At the 
level of political decision-making by the society as a whole, this means 
fostering an active public discourse that feeds a plurality of environmental 
views and concerns into government decision-making (Smith 2003). At the 
level of individuals, in turn, it implies a willingness to confront one’s own 
views in an open-minded, reflective way, as the only pathway towards 
overcoming the mindsets and behaviour patterns that, not least according 
to eco-authoritarians themselves, have given rise to the environmental 
crisis in the first place (Bäckstrand et al. 2010: 5-6). 
It seems, then, that eco-authoritarians have prematurely thrown the 
democratic baby out with the bathwater: Even though the existing political 
structures do reproduce unsustainability, and structural change is thus 
needed, it is not democracy that is to blame (Niemeyer 2014: 17). Rather, 
democracy is itself constrained by those structures in society that are 
primarily culpable, and removing those constraints – in other words, 
promoting deeper democratisation – is the very key to the solution. Thus, 
the same concern about unsustainable outcomes arising from existing 
political structures is recognised from an avowedly democratic outlook. 
The environmental philosopher Dale Jamieson, for instance, laments that 
‘sadly, it is not entirely clear that democracy is up to the challenge of 
climate change’, yet concludes that rather than curtailing democracy, it 
needs to become ‘more responsive’ (Jamieson 2014: 100). In other words, 
following John Dewey, ‘the cure for the ailments of democracy is more 
democracy’ (Dewey 1927: 327). 
The case for democracy 
There are good reasons why many environmentalists have historically been 
committed to democracy, rather than authoritarianism; and parallel to new 
calls for eco-authoritarianism there have been renewed calls for ‘green 
democracy’ (e.g. Dryzek 1987, 2000; Dobson 1996a; Arias-Maldonado 2000, 
2012; Smith 2003; Eckersley 2004; Niemeyer 2013, 2014). In this literature, 
democracy is seen as nothing less than ‘one of the hallmarks’ of 
environmental theory and practice (Latta 2007: 378) in that democracy is 
critical for ensuring that environmental concern is present in the overall 
political discourse. Only democratic systems retain a sufficiently open 
political agenda for the inclusion of all interests and voices, including that 
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 of concern for future generations and nature itself (Ward 2008: 387; Dryzek 
2000: 147-54; Goodin 1996; Dobson 1996b). The diversity of perspectives 
so represented helps promote flows of information, experimentation and 
learning (Smith 2003: 62; Burnell 2012: 823). In particular, processes of 
democratic deliberation, in which individuals are confronted with others’ 
views and expected to justify publicly their own, encourages the rethinking 
of positions and the adoption of a broader, more public-minded 
perspective (Baber 2004: 332; Smith 2003: 60-6). The new perspectives 
opened up through such individual and societal reflection can be seen as a 
stock of resources for understanding the present and developing new 
visions for the future; thus, the more open, diverse and free the public 
discourse, the more learning is taking place, and the more pathways for 
continuous adaptiveness open up. In short, insofar as ‘democracy is a 
matter of effective communication’ (Dryzek 1995: 13) – open, inclusive 
and reflexive – it is democracy that facilitates the foundations for 
fundamental change to occur in societies, especially in a context of 
adapting to external conditions that are themselves in constant change 
(Barry 2012: 269). 
Thus, authoritarian enforcement becomes unconvincing as a strategy once 
the focus shifts from considering isolated environmental problems, or the 
need to achieve one particular goal (such as reaching a certain lower level 
of greenhouse gas emissions), towards recognising that (un)sustainability 
is a more complex and unfolding social phenomenon, which must 
therefore be addressed at the level of the social, political and economic 
structures that drive it (Stehr 2015: 450). As a general societal 
characteristic and outlook, sustainability plays out over the long term; and 
it responds to a context of complex socio-ecological systems that are 
constantly changing. The constraints this sets for societies – such as 
resource scarcity, ecological feedback loops, and uncertainty over tipping 
points – are thus misconceived as isolated, abnormal threats akin to an 
‘emergency’ or ‘war’ situation; rather, they constitute the general and 
permanent context in which human societies evolve over time, if not ‘the 
essence of our dynamic situatedness’ (Hilde 2012: 900, emphasis added). 
In such a context, the challenge of sustainability becomes more intricate: 
Rather than ‘just’ having to enforce some sacrifices so as to survive in one 
moment in time, as the eco-authoritarian argument suggests, the 
challenge is to find ways to flourish as a society over the long term (Jackson 
2009: 16). Whereas presenting the environmental context as one 
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 momentary ‘life-or-death’ scenario, whose ‘no-real-choice quality’ 
(Saward 1993: 64) would seem to justify any means necessary to ensure 
survival, such justification becomes unconvincing as a constant, long-term 
vision for society, for which something more than mere survival is at stake. 
Here, democracy plays not just an instrumental, but an intrinsic role. 
Straightforward though it may seem to portray a necessity of technocratic 
leadership for the resolution of very specific environmental problems for 
which there is a clear-cut technological solution, such lines of argument 
are simplistic and superficial when it comes to unsustainability as a much 
broader phenomenon, and sustainability as a much more complex 
challenge, of a deeply normative rather than technical character. As John 
Robinson (2004: 379-80) puts it: 
 [S]ustainability is ultimately an issue of human behavior, and negotiation 
over preferred futures, under conditions of deep contingency and 
uncertainty. It is an inherently normative concept, rooted in real world 
problems and very different sets of values and moral judgements. 
With such a value-laden and dynamic character, democracy becomes itself 
central to sustainability; for what is then needed are neither quick fixes 
nor defences aimed at restoring some pre-existing status quo, but rather 
normatively persuasive socio-political structures that help to continually 
‘negotiate preferred futures’. In other words, sustainability becomes not a 
momentary state, but a never-ending ‘process of social learning’ (Arias-
Maldonado 2000: 52). This goes beyond technical and scientific parameters, 
but requires engagement with the different possible (and thus contested) 
values, ethics and visions of what societies could and should look like – an 
engagement which, to have any chance of being equally inclusive of all 
members’ right to flourish, must involve all those affected by it. 
Sustainable prosperity in any normatively meaningful sense can then arise 
only if it is ‘discursively shaped and socially decided’ (Arias-Maldonado 
2000: 49). This presupposes a socially inclusive form of governance that 
involves all citizens in its shaping such that outcomes are recognised as 
legitimate; a form of governance maintained by civic engagement and 
dialogue as opposed to force or manipulation (Brulle 2010: 91-2). Instead 
of enforcement, sustainability requires ‘deep political commitment’ to 
support the necessary adaptations (Niemeyer 2014: 16); a matter not of 
‘rallying obedience’ for policies that would otherwise be rejected, but of 
creating the space for a collective search for alternative ways of living. Not 
only is democracy instrumentally necessary for determining what futures 
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 are indeed ‘preferred’ in this sense, but as the necessary basis for people’s 
autonomy over their lives and thoughts, democracy becomes an intrinsic 
component of any vision of human flourishing. 
This is what is implied by the term sustainable prosperity: Sustainability as 
not just the mere physical survival of human beings in the face of a specific 
crisis, but the capacity of all individuals, social groups and communities to 
lead lives that are meaningful to them, despite the general context of 
ecological limits. Inasmuch as leading a prosperous and meaningful life 
goes beyond fulfilling people’s material needs only (Jackson 2009: 36), it 
cannot be simply instituted for individuals, groups and communities from 
the top down. Rather, the autonomy and freedom embodied by democracy 
are not only critical capabilities for flourishing, but meaningful elements 
of flourishing itself (Sen 1993; 1999). For this, only democracy can provide 
a political foundation, for only democracy respects this freedom and 
autonomy, and allows for collective action to be shaped through fair and 
inclusive political processes. 
Thus, in summary, the complex and systemic nature of the ‘new’ 
environmental crises highlights the inadequacy both of eco-authoritarians’ 
portrayal of the sustainability challenge as a ‘life-or-death’ scenario, an 
‘exception’, or even a ‘war’, and its portrayal by eco-optimists as a mere 
‘externality’ that can be ‘managed’. If the underlying causes of 
unsustainability are structural, only a socio-political response that 
addresses these can be successful. Whilst eco-optimism fails in this regard 
by suggesting no structural change is necessary, eco-authoritarians suggest 
the wrong kind of structural change: one that is oriented towards too 
narrow and indeed too short-term a goal as surviving a particular 
environmental crisis, as opposed to laying the foundations for a lasting 
and holistic sustainable prosperity. Rather than moving away from 
democracy, our governing structures and practices must be centrally 
rooted in democratic participation so as to facilitate a genuine, inclusive 
dialogue; one that is reflective enough to both negotiate across different 
values and ideas and to make possible new future visions for society. From 
this perspective, the unsustainability reproduced by current government 
structures is more likely to be due to a lack of democratic engagement 
rather than too much. 
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 Sources of democratic constraint 
A critical part of CUSP’s research agenda is to better understand the factors 
that constrain sustainable prosperity and thus to consider interventions 
that might overcome or at least ameliorate these constraints. For our 
research stream, the question is more specific: How is democracy 
constrained such that it undermines the potential for realising sustainable 
prosperity? According to John Dryzek, all we have today is ‘a minimally 
authentic liberal democracy’, as a result of capitalist forces imposing 
structural ‘antidemocratic constraints’ on our societies that get in the way 
of deeper democratisation (Dryzek 1996: 9-10). We highlight briefly two 
broad sources of constraints that are worthy of further investigation: the 
narrowness of a capitalist-dominated public discourse and practices and 
the short-termism inherent in political decision making. These (and other) 
constraints are mutually reinforcing. Breaking through some of these 
constraints, so as to nurture a deeper, more authentic form of democracy, 
can present new pathways towards sustainability that harness democratic 
reflexivity and engagement. 
Critical analysis of the unsustainable characteristics of current patterns of 
production and consumption has been widely explored (see for example 
Jackson 2017). We do not need to rehearse the ways in which contemporary 
capitalism in its myriad forms (consumer, financial, globalised, etc.) 
threatens environmental and social viability. Rather, our interest is in 
better understanding how ideas and practices of contemporary capitalism 
constrain the potential of democracy to respond to unsustainabilities (see 
Rocheleau 1999; Dryzek 2000: 142-3). This is part of a broader literature on 
the myriad ways that capitalism subverts democracy. Constraints take a 
number of forms, but particularly problematic from a sustainability 
perspective is the narrowness of political discourse nurtured by contem-
porary capitalism. Although ‘capitalism’ comes in a variety of forms and 
modes, at the discursive level they are united by ideas associated with 
economic growth and consumption that have become hegemonic to the 
point of ‘lock[ing] us in to an “iron cage” of consumerism’ (Jackson 2017: 
104). Governments dependent on the capitalist growth dynamic cannot but 
perpetuate ‘a particularly materialistic individualism’ as the general 
culture or ‘governmentality’ (Jackson 2017: 196-7). As a result, govern-
mental structures and practices undermine a broader-minded, critical 
public discourse, and alternative ideas and practices become difficult to 
articulate and envision. Democracy as a cauldron and competition of ideas 
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 is undermined and prospects for new innovations impoverished as 
alternative ways of organising social and economic life are not entertained 
(Dryzek 1996: 12). 
For instance, political scientists have long recognised the ways in which 
the structural advantage enjoyed by the wealthy undermines any 
meaningful sense of democratic pluralism. A recent study by Martin Gilens 
(2014) provides empirical insight into the extent to which policies of the 
US track the interests of the wealthy: the interests of the poor and 
vulnerable are only serviced when they happen to elide with those of the 
most privileged in society. Gerry Stoker (2016), moreover, offers evidence 
of the extent to which citizens tend to understand politics in the same way 
that they attend to consumption. Contemporary capitalism thus reinforces 
forms of individualism and self-interested competitiveness within not just 
the economic, but also social and political spheres. This kind of discourse 
undermines the democratic necessity of developing collective responses to 
critical public problems, such as the need for sustainable prosperity.  
Concretely, what democratic theorists bemoan about capitalism, despite 
its variability in form, is the dominance of an economic, instrumental 
rationality in political discourse (Habermas 1984), treating individuals as 
economically rational, self-interested ‘social isolates’ (Dryzek 1996: 108). 
In contrast, democratic politics rests on a ‘communicative rationality’ 
(Habermas 1984) that is realised in democratic collectives of people that 
are ‘competent, reflective, critical, and social’ in nature (Dryzek 1996: 108). 
Whereas a model of politics based on instrumental rationality is tied to the 
reproduction of a narrow consumerist culture, the greater reflexivity of 
communicative rationality brings to the fore a diversity of voices, 
viewpoints and concerns. Not only is this broader focus necessary in the 
face of problems as complex and difficult to coordinate as environmental 
ones (Dryzek 2000: 143), but by nurturing an ‘enlarged’, less individualistic 
and materialistic kind of discourse, it is able to give room to visions of 
sustainability that would otherwise remain suppressed – including the 
voices of future generations and nature themselves (Dryzek 2000: 152; 
Niemeyer 2013: 435). 
As such, the discursive hegemony of capitalism has not just led to a retreat 
of government from collective public action on sustainability, but also 
diminishes the public spaces in which new visions might otherwise flourish. 
The attractiveness of ecological modernisation thus becomes clear in the 
way it attempts to deal with environmental challenges through existing 
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 capitalist structures and practices. It is precisely these structures, however, 
that at a deeper level undermine not just democracy itself, but also the 
richness and reflectiveness of its public discourse, including on 
sustainability. 
A second source of constraint is short-termism. Again, there is an intimate 
connection between short-termism and different forms of capitalism. We 
have already indicated how national income accounting and other public 
accounting practices have come to limit our political imaginary. But they 
also reinforce short-term decision-making. Whether we are thinking of the 
way in which governments respond to quarterly GDP figures or that the 
fate of publicly owned companies are tied to quarterly profit reports, such 
economic practices discipline the judgements of political and economic 
elites to the short-term. The idea of long-term planning is too often lost in 
the response to immediate financial indicators. Equally if we focus on 
everyday social practices, we see how contemporary societies prioritize 
immediate consumption over longer-term rhythms and time scales. The 
way that social practices are ‘locked-in’ to unsustainable systems of 
provision such as energy, transport, food systems that prioritise short-term 
returns makes alternative approaches difficult and unattractive. The 
carbon-based nature of these practices means that the future is ‘colonized’ 
as a ‘resource for the present’ (Pahl et al. 2014: 379). 
But it would be folly to hold capitalism up as the single cause of a lack of 
long-term thinking – rather capitalist practices reinforce other structural 
tendencies towards short-termism (MacKenzie 2017a). At the level of the 
political system, we can highlight three dynamics that undermine the 
long-term. The first is the way in which four-to-five year electoral cycles 
incentivise more immediate and strategic party-political motivations 
amongst the political class, running counter to issues that transcend a 
number of such cycles. Short-term costs are avoided and burdens shifted 
beyond the current electoral cycle. Second, the structural advantage that 
powerful interests enjoy enables them to protect the status quo. Economic 
actors embedded in the carbon-based economy have a strong interest in 
resisting low carbon transitions; older generations tend to have their 
short-term interests protected as they vote in higher numbers. Reflecting 
on the challenge of taking forward climate policy that clashes with extant 
interests (within and without government), John Ashton, one time UK 
Government’s Special Representative on Climate Change, has stated: 
‘Where there is a contradiction, the forces of incumbency start with a 
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 massive advantage’ (Klein 2014: 151). Third, there is a lack of political 
representation of future generations within our political structures: those 
who will be most affected by long term environmental damage are unable 
to make their voices heard and to hold current generations to account 
(Dobson 1996b). 
These structural political factors are complemented by psychological 
dynamics that reinforce short-termism. Psychologists and economists 
highlight how individuals’ perceptions, judgements and decisions are 
affected by positive time preferences and discounting of the future 
(Frederick et al 2002). The lack of salience of structural challenges such as 
climate change increases psychological distance for decision makers and 
citizens alike.  
Recognising these diverse sources of short-termism is important because 
the focus of critique within green political thought is often primarily 
towards forms of capitalism. Our brief analysis suggests that there are 
political, social and psychological dynamics aside from the discourses and 
practices of contemporary capitalism that need to be recognised in 
contemplating a democratic response to sustainable prosperity. 
Constraining capitalism alone will not bring about a long-term orientation 
in democratic politics – although it would make it easier! A key theme for 
CUSP, then, is to better understand the interplay between these various 
democratic constraints in order that relevant democratic responses can be 
articulated. It is to these ‘democratic cures’ that we now turn. 
Democratising a constrained democracy 
Existing unsustainability is reproduced through the structures and 
practices of political decision-making in contemporary Western societies; 
and so its solution lies in transforming these underlying structures and 
practices into more sustainable alternatives. We have already established 
that authoritarianism does not present a convincing alternative, that 
democracy is key to sustainable prosperity, but that in its current form it is 
too constrained to play its critical role. This final section explores 
tentatively the potential of different approaches towards democratisation 
that might open up new pathways towards a democratic vision of 
sustainable prosperity. A more robust analysis of these approaches will 
follow in future work within CUSP. 
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 A. Participatory and deliberative democratic institutions 
Progressive ecological politics has long been associated with participatory 
forms of democratic organisation. Through direct engagement of citizens, 
advocates aim to realise fundamental principles of democracy – political 
equality and popular control – and more environmentally sustainable 
decisions as citizens come to recognise and take responsibility for the 
ecological limitations we face and develop creative solutions. But often the 
call for more participation lacks specificity. Participation can take many 
forms, with the design of institutions having a significant effect on the 
capacity of citizens to craft more sustainable outcomes (Newig et al. 2017). 
Take for example participatory budgeting (PB), a practice that emerged 
originally in Brazil and now has spread worldwide. While many recent 
manifestations of PB lack the radical edge of the original Porto Alegre 
model, the principle of local citizens taking control of decisions about the 
allocation of budgetary resources has remained (Sintomer et al 2016; 
Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012; Smith 2009). There is no question that PB can 
enhance political equality and popular control (particularly amongst 
politically marginalised and poor communities) leading to significant 
resource redistribution; all key elements of sustainable prosperity. But its 
annual cycle can act as a constraint to embedding long-term thinking. 
Suggestions have been made as to how PB might embed a more ecological 
consciousness: a proposal for participatory emissions budgeting (Cohen 
2012) for example, would entail participants not only taking into account 
the financial cost of projects, but also the embedded carbon. There would 
not only be a financial budget, but also a carbon budget. 
A completely different form of participatory governance, direct legislation 
(citizens’ initiative and popular referendums), gives citizens direct control 
over agenda-setting and final decision making through the ballot. While 
there is evidence that such institutions have been used by environmental 
groups to raise environmental issues on the agenda in countries such as 
Switzerland, questions are raised about the extent to which the binary 
nature of ballots can capture the nuances of sustainable prosperity. Equally, 
the power of money to influence outcomes requires careful attention to the 
rules and regulations that enable direct legislation (Smith 2009). 
A set of institutions that has generated particular interest in recent years 
are randomly-selected mini-publics, such as citizens’ assemblies, juries 
and panels (Grönlund et al. 2014; Setälä and Smith 2018). A defining 
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 characteristic of mini-publics is their capacity to promote democratic 
deliberation through the combination of a diverse membership and active 
facilitation. As such mini-publics are recognised as a form of deliberative 
democratic governance that may be particularly well suited for dealing 
with issues of environmental sustainability (Niemeyer 2013; 2014). Forms 
of random or stratified sampling (also known as sortition) ensure a diverse 
group of citizens (far more diverse than any other existing political 
institution) and thus the likelihood that a plurality of environmental and 
other values will be articulated. Further, deliberation is perceived as being 
particularly sensitive to ‘other-regarding’ or ‘public-spirited’ preferences 
and perspectives and as such is taken to be more likely to orientate 
attention to the long-term impacts of policy choices and considerations of 
non-human nature. Such deliberative environments are seen as creative 
spaces in which new ideas and options can be fostered. Evidence from 
experiments with mini-publics provides support for these claims, showing 
that they outperform more traditional democratic institutions in the ways 
in which they consider future generations and non-human nature (Smith 
2003; Hobson and Niemeyer 2011). It is on this basis that advocates have 
built the case for using sortition more extensively, including within 
legislatures (MacKenzie 2017b). 
One area where more extensive research is needed is the role that 
emerging digital technologies can play in enhancing democratic 
participation and deliberation in shaping and creating sustainable 
prosperity. Our understanding of the contribution of digital technologies 
to democratic practices remains nascent: the variety of affordances of the 
myriad tools, technologies and platforms makes it incredibly difficult to 
make generalisations beyond the fact that digital brings with it 
opportunities to overcome traditional barriers of time and space that have 
constrained democratic participation. Certainly this perspective is 
prevalent in the articulation of ‘smart’ and ‘eco’ cities, although how much 
this moves beyond rhetoric is questionable (Joss 2016). 
The tendency within democratic theory has been to focus on a fairly 
traditional conception of the political, but our concerns with the 
democratisation of organisations can be extended to other realms. Perhaps 
the most challenging is the economic sphere in which hierarchical forms of 
organisation have dominated. Cooperatives, mutuals and other forms 
within the social economy have long stood in opposition to contemporary 
corporate structures and behaviours – and have democratic principles at 
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 their core; often along with commitment to environmental sustainability. 
The emergence of new forms of social enterprise and alternative forms of 
stakeholder organisation (such as B-Corps) offer the potential for a further 
democratising force within the economy. Our interest in the potential role 
of democratic forms of economic organisation overlaps with other parts of 
the CUSP research agenda that has a particular focus on alternative social 
enterprise and business models to address social and environmental issues.  
PB, mini-publics, new digital platforms and social economy organisations 
provide explicit examples of the forms of democratic organisation on 
which a sustainable transition might be built. That said, the evidence of 
their effectiveness tends to focus primarily on their internal practices. 
What is lacking is an analysis of how such participatory institutions can be 
integrated meaningfully into political and economic systems. Too often 
participatory processes such as PB and mini-publics are organised at the 
whim of political elites (Böker 2017). If social economy organisations are to 
thrive, then market conditions need to be structured such that they no 
longer advantage for-private-profit forms of organisation (Smith and 
Teasdale 2012).  What we lack is systematic reflection on the nature of the 
regulatory regimes that would recognise and indeed prioritise the 
democratic preconditions for participation in production and political 
decision making.  
B. Prefigurative politics 
One response by environmentalists to the absence of such democratic 
preconditions has been the adoption of prefigurative strategies aimed at 
building alternative forms of production and consumption. This is a 
strategy focused on the development and implementation of typically 
small-scale, local, concrete projects such as alternative food systems or 
community energy projects (Yates 2015a). Like practice-based activism 
more generally, it realises those solutions in the here and now, yet the 
prefigurative approach distinguishes itself by having in place some 
strategy aimed at ensuring that small-scale solutions eventually lead to 
more general social change (de Moor et al. 2017). It ‘seeks to create the 
new society “in the shell of the old” by developing counterhegemonic 
institutions and modes of interaction that embody the desired 
transformation’ (Leach 2013: 1). 
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 Due to the small-scale, practical nature of prefigurative projects, the 
position of prefigurative politics in democracy is not straightforward. In 
many cases, prefigurative strategies are motivated by a disenchantment 
with the willingness or ability of liberal democratic institutions to get 
things done and a preference for ‘do it yourself’ activism instead (de Moor 
et al. 2017). In this sense, prefigurative politics more generally might be 
seen as an ‘exit’ strategy from the institutional democratic process 
(Hirschman 1970).  
However, this ‘exit’ is not generalisable and often not permanent. While 
some strategies to ‘diffuse’ prefigurative projects, like ‘scaling up’ and 
‘replication’ (Seyfang and Longhurst 2016), can remain outside the 
institutional democratic process, they clearly engage with the wider public 
sphere. Secondly, rather than asserting closed solutions to ecological and 
social problems, the ethos of these projects is more often experimental and 
designed to accommodate social justice concerns. The deliberation, 
dialogue and negotiation between conflicting values and interests that we 
have argued are essential to sustainability are evident in the way that those 
pursuing these projects seek to resolve strategic dilemmas. For example, a 
cooperative committed to retrofitting older houses to reduce carbon 
emissions, which is staffed by activists whose CVs show them to have 
many years of experience in protests, worries that they mainly connect 
with those who are already committed to this goal and have resources to 
invest in property. They therefore devote time to trying to reach low 
income groups and to thinking about strategies for adapting to climate 
change, which are more relevant to the needs of these groups, even if 
doing this runs the risk of seeming to acquiesce to climate change.  
Here prefigurative projects can be seen as democracy’s practical 
laboratories where citizens can collectively come up with solutions, similar 
to the way deliberative publics do, and where citizens can explore and 
demonstrate the practical viability of solutions. The evidence generated 
can serve as exemplars for others, including governments. As such, 
prefigurative strategies can be about strengthening citizens’ ‘voice’ when 
entering the participatory arena. 
Indeed, an important notion in prefigurative politics is the idea of ‘means-
ends equivalence’; that is, that if alternative practices are to prefigure the 
world one wishes to see in the future, means should reflect ends, broadly 
speaking (Yates 2015b). For progressive prefigurative collectives this has 
had important implications for the democratic organization of their 
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 projects, motivating the use of horizontal and consensual decision-making 
structures (Maeckelbergh 2011). This not only underlines the importance 
of prefigurative politics as a ‘tool for democracy’, but the egalitarian, open-
ended way of experimenting with alternatives also supports the notion of 
sustainability as flexibility and reflexivity. When organized according to 
such principles, Smith and Stirling (2018: 91) argue, prefigurative projects 
have the potential to democratise sustainable innovations, thereby 
ensuring they are ‘truly effective in addressing the needs of society’. 
In sum, prefigurative politics can play several roles in strengthening 
democracy to advance sustainability. It presents citizen-led and 
democratically organized forms of experimentation and implementation of 
concrete solutions. It offers a starting point to diffuse those solutions to 
the wider society, whether by engaging with political institutions or not. It 
can involve, or keep involved, citizens in politics in an off-putting political 
context until political opportunities emerge. And in prefigurative projects, 
participants often experiment with sustainability and democratic forms of 
organisation at the same time. 
C. Reforming established political structures and institutions 
Beyond this ‘grassroots’ level, there is scope for democratic innovation 
also at the level of political systems, where there is strong evidence that 
highly centralised regimes are less effective in responding to the demands 
of ecological and social sustainability. Not only do democracies outperform 
authoritarian regimes, but devolution, with its creation of multiple veto 
points, appears to act as a break on the power of vested interests (Jacobs 
2011; Klein 2014). Social democratic culture also appears more supportive 
of long-term thinking (Stoker 2014). That said, Peter Christoff and Robyn 
Eckersley (2011) were unable to isolate any particular set of factors that 
correlate with action on climate change. 
The centrality of elected legislatures in the democratic imaginary has 
meant that a number of proposals have emerged for reform. There has 
been some enthusiasm for the idea of guaranteed legislative 
representation for future generations and even non-human nature 
(Dobson 1996; Ekeli 2005) to ensure consideration of their interests in the 
legislative process. Practical questions arise, however, as to how such 
representatives would be selected; what aspects of the future and non-
human nature are to be represented; and whether political will could be 
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 mustered for such a dramatic change to the representative principle (Smith 
2003: 114-118).  
An idea that has gained particular traction within deliberative politics has 
been that of a randomly selected second (or even third) chamber 
(Thompson 2010: 31; MacKenzie 2017b). This is not a purely 
sustainability-orientated design proposal but one that has broader 
pedigree amongst democratic reformers (Barnett and Carty 1998). The case 
for a randomly selected chamber extrapolates from the evidence from 
experiments with mini-publics that indicates that in such deliberative 
contexts, citizens tend to orientate themselves towards the long-term and 
give due weight to broader environmental and social concerns. Whether or 
not such a chamber were explicitly charged with specific consideration of 
future generations and/or non-human nature in their policy and legislative 
activities, it is argued that sustainability-oriented thinking would emerge. 
There are opportunities to promote such an idea in places where the 
constitution of the second chamber is under debate (e.g. the UK House of 
Lords) or where we find unicameral systems (such as the devolved 
legislatures and assemblies in the UK). Such a proposal deserves attention, 
but the differences between the practices of a legislative chamber and the 
experience of deliberative mini-publics must be recognised: can we 
generalise from individual experiments to a permanent body that has such 
extensive political powers; and what other reforms of the institutional 
architecture would be needed to support its effective working (Owen and 
Smith 2017)? 
Not all proposals focus on changing the composition of the legislature. 
Ekeli (2009) has offered an interesting proposal for how parliamentary 
procedures might be reformed to better protect long-term interests: sub-
majority rules to delay and/or require a referendum on a bill that threatens 
serious harm upon posterity. Since such a suggestion does not undermine 
the status and decision making power of existing representative 
institutions, it is arguably more politically feasible. Less politically 
acceptable given the current lack of confidence in political elites, is the 
proposal for longer terms for representatives: Timo Järvensivu (2012) 
suggests 15 years as a way of counteracting the structural dysfunctionali-
ties associated with short electoral cycles. Even more controversially, 
Philippe van Parijs (1998) proposes methods for reducing the electoral 
power of older generations, either by removing their voting rights or giving 
greater weight to the votes of young people. 
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 Finally, in relation to legislatures, we can point to the actual practice of the 
permanent Finnish Parliamentary Committee for the Future that has a 
specific remit to consider the long-term within the work of the assembly.1 
The Committee consists of 17 parliamentarians from all political parties. 
There is work to be done to explore the effectiveness of such an 
arrangement and to understand why the Committee seems to work well in 
Finland, but its equivalent in Germany is much less well respected and 
influential.  
Beyond the legislature, constitutional clauses that embody considerations 
of future generations (including those focused on environmental 
sustainability) have been a site of particular attention, not least because 
they have proliferated in the development of new constitutions for 
emerging democracies (Hayward 2005; Tremmel 2006). Proposals for 
embedding procedural environmental participatory rights (such as 
promoted in the Aarhus Convention) and the precautionary principle 
(Eckersley 2004) followed in their wake. But a quick look at the evidence of 
the environmental records of polities that have embedded such 
constitutional clauses indicates the challenge of working at this level: 
while constitutions embed principles and values, this does not guarantee 
or ensure their considerations in day-to-day politics and policy-making. 
How the distance from constitutional principle to political practice can be 
overcome needs to be the subject of further investigation. One option is to 
further empower legal courses of action. 
The realisation of constitutional clauses along with specific sustainable 
development legislation has been a driver for the creation of 
Commissioners (or Ombudsmen) responsible for promoting and defending 
aspects of sustainability. Such commissioners are a relatively novel form of 
political organisation, some charged specifically to defend the interests of 
future generations; others with an explicit environment or sustainable 
development remit. Children’s commissioners can also be seen to fit 
within this family. The few examples of specific Commissioners for Future 
Generations have had some effect but have proved politically vulnerable: 
the Israeli Commissioner was decommissioned with a change in 
government; the powers of the Hungarian Commissioner were weakened 
as a right wing nationalist government dismantled much of the 
infrastructure of oversight. It is the relatively new Welsh Commissioner 
                                                        
1 http://web.eduskunta.fi/Resource.phx/parliament/committees/future.htx 
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 that is currently seen as an exemplar of this particular class of organisation, 
with its powers to require action on the part of other public bodies being of 
particular interest. It has also been active in attempting to engage the 
public in its programme of work – arguably a significant development in 
strengthening the democratic legitimacy of these often fragile institutions 
(Smith 2015). 
D. Deliberative systems and cultural change 
The analysis of democratic innovation at all levels tends to focus on single 
institutions, be they forms of participatory and deliberative engagement or 
more established and traditional democratic institutions. In comparison, 
the deliberative systems approach emphasises the need to move beyond the 
focus on single institutions to understand deliberative democracy as an 
emergent property of the interaction between different societal actors, 
sites and institutions that together make up the polity (Mansbridge et al. 
2012). While, for example, experiments with mini-publics have been useful 
for gathering insights about how deliberative effects play out in practice 
under different controllable circumstances (Dryzek 2010: 9), fundamental 
to their ‘real-life’ impact at the relevant scale will be their integration into 
wider societal systems (Curato and Böker 2016). A deliberative systems 
approach resonates with the demands of sustainability, which requires 
democratic reflexivity not just at the level of human systems, but socio-
ecological systems (Dryzek and Pickering 2017). 
Much of the work on deliberative systems to date has been fairly 
conceptual in nature, but its orientation towards understanding the 
implications of how institutions and practices are ‘coupled’ or integrated is 
crucial for an effective democratic response to sustainability challenges. 
The approach has been applied to environmental sustainability by a small 
number of authors. Niemeyer argues that it is the ‘deliberativeness’ of the 
democratic system as a whole that is decisive for sustainability (Niemeyer 
2013: 434); Hayley Stevenson and John Dryzek (2014) have used the 
approach to show how authentic, inclusive and consequential deliberation 
is often thwarted in global politics. Similarly, Tobias Böhmelt et al.’s (2016) 
empirical work shows that inclusivity at the level of the democratic system 
can indeed be linked with better climate outputs, but their translation into 
tangible outcomes is limited by the countervailing effects of the largely 
symbolic efforts associated with current liberal-capitalist polities.  
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 Thus, what remains an open question is how applicable the theoretical 
constructs of systemic deliberation are to the complexity of sustainability 
governance at these larger scales. How deliberative democracy can be 
enabled at this level is unclear, and thus we are not in the position to 
generate conclusive insights (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014: 25; Böhmelt et 
al. 2016: 1283). Moreover, even in their theoretical descriptions, 
deliberative systems leave considerable room for different interpretations 
– at worst no longer incorporating any actual deliberation between citizens 
– of the type that has been linked to sustainability thinking – at all (Owen 
and Smith 2015).  
In contrast to an institutional or actor-centric interpretation of 
deliberative systems in a functional sense, an alternative view with a wider 
societal focus considers the extent to which a ‘deliberative culture’, or 
‘deliberative thinking’, can emerge within society at large. Stevenson and 
Dryzek highlight the role of deliberation in promoting a type of ‘ecological 
citizenship’ that includes recognising obligations to others in relation to 
environmental sustainability (Stevenson and Dryzek 2014: 15). Similarly, 
Niemeyer speaks of the need to develop a wider ‘deliberative capacity’ and 
‘deliberative cultures’ (Niemeyer 2013: 445-6). Indeed, in the systemic, 
society-wide sense, deliberative democracy can be conceived of as a 
political culture (Böker 2017: 33): It is effectively realised not when 
selected citizens are specifically prompted to adhere to deliberative norms 
for the purposes of a one-off experiment, but rather when the society at 
large endorses and internalises these norms as part of their general, self-
driven culture. A central concern within our research agenda is to better 
understand how these different articulations of deliberative systems and 
cultures can better inform a transformational democratic project of 
sustainable prosperity. 
Conclusion 
The governance of environmental sustainability has long been associated 
with both authoritarianism and democracy as necessary foundations. Our 
contribution to this ongoing debate is the argument that although it is true 
that the necessary structural changes towards sustainability have not 
emerged within liberal democracies, the problem is not democracy as such, 
but the properties of the narrow political discourse and a short-term 
orientation that characterise politics within this particular democratic 
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 model. Replacing democracy with authoritarian forms of government is 
unconvincing as a solution; rather, the innately sustainability-enhancing 
features of democracy must be freed from these entrenched properties that 
have so far constrained its true potential. 
This argument informs our research within CUSP on the political 
foundations of, and new avenues towards, a vision of sustainable 
prosperity. All the more if environmental sustainability is connected to 
notions of prosperity, it becomes clear that democracy – as the only form 
of government that secures citizens’ liberty, autonomy, participation, and 
thus socio-political well-being – must be central. Against the new surge of 
eco-authoritarian voices, we have therefore outlined a number of possible 
new directions for the democratic governance of sustainability. Both 
small-scale experimental and large-scale institutional and legislative 
innovations have the potential to induce greater consideration for 
environmental concerns and a long-term perspective in our political 
decision-making; while emerging deliberative cultures and prefigurative 
movements can bring the necessary critical and imaginative impulses into 
the political arena. Exploring these avenues further is not just an exercise 
in political utopia when the harsh realities simply no longer afford such 
luxury. It is for the sake of both human and environmental well-being that 
a democratic way forward is not just desirable, but necessary. 
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